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Background: To investigate whether Swedish physicians, contrary to Swedish health care policy, employ
considerations of patient responsibility for illness when rationing expensive treatments.
Methods: A random sample of oncologists and pulmonologists made up the main study-group (n = 296). A random
sample of GPs (n = 289) and participants from the general population (n = 513) was used as contrast group. The
participants randomly received one version of a questionnaire containing a case description of a terminally ill
lung cancer patient. The two versions differed in only one aspect: in one version the patient was a smoker and in
the other a non-smoker. The main questions were whether to offer a novel, expensive and marginally life-prolonging
treatment and whether the patient could be held responsible for her illness. The quantitative data was analysed using
Chi2-tests and comments were analysed using content analysis.
Results: Among oncologists and pulmonologists, 78% (95% CI: 72-85) would offer the treatment to the non-smoker
and 66% (95% CI: 58-74) to the smoker (Chi-2 = 5.4, df = 1, p = 0.019). Among the GPs, 69% (95% CI: 61-76) would treat
the non-smoker and 56% (95% CI: 48-64) the smoker (Chi-1 = 4.9, df = 1 and p = 0.026). Among the general population
the corresponding proportions were 84% (95% CI: 79-88) and 69% (95% CI: 63-74).
Conclusion: This study indicates that applying an experimental design allowed us to go beyond the official norms and
to show that, compared to a smoking patient, both the general population and physicians are more inclined to treat a
non-smoking patient. This clearly runs counter to the official Swedish health care norms. It also seems to run counter
to the fact that among the physicians studied, there was no association between finding the patient responsible for
her disease and the inclination to treat her. We think these paradoxical findings merit further studies.
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Justice is one of the central virtues in medical ethics, and
how to create a just health care system a question of per-
ennial debate [1]. With medical costs rising faster than the
capacity to pay, fair priority setting stands out as an in-
creasingly important aspect of health care justice [2].
For a long time, the Rawls-via-Daniels view that health
care should be distributed according to patients’ needs
but not to deserts or responsibility has been dominant
[3]. Most, but not all, health care systems currently* Correspondence: joar.bjork@gmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.operate in accordance with this dictum [4]. In Sweden, a
1996 amendment to the health care law explicitly states
that priority-setting based on whether or not a medical
condition is self-inflicted – hereafter termed the respon-
sibility principle – is not admissible. The amendment is
referred to as the ethical platform for Swedish priority
setting [5].
This view, however, is not universally accepted. There
is now a large body of literature defending the use of the
responsibility principle in priority-setting procedures
[6-8]. One (but not the only [8]) current defence of the
responsibility principle is so-called luck egalitarianism, a
view that differentiates between inequalities arising from
factors within the individual’s control and those that arehis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Björk et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2015) 16:28 Page 2 of 8beyond the individual’s control. According to luck egali-
tarianism, justice requires that only the latter and not
the former be compensated for.
In some of the literature, a distinction is made be-
tween backward-looking and forward-looking principles
[9]. A backward-looking responsibility principle claims
that patients who have caused their bad health through
voluntary but imprudent choices in the past should be
down-prioritised, required to pay more for medical care,
or in some other way stand back to others who have made
more prudent choices in the past. A forward-looking re-
sponsibility principle, on the other hand, is a consequen-
tialist notion, down-prioritising patients whose current
imprudent health behaviour might affect prospective treat-
ment (e.g. rationing access to liver transplantations for
non-abstainers as continued alcohol consumption could
damage the new liver). For the purpose of this paper, when
we refer to the responsibility principle we mean the
backward-looking kind described above.
Medical situations that have been used to illustrate pos-
sible applications of the responsibility principle include,
apart from liver transplantations in alcohol-related end-
stage liver disease [10], various types of cancer due to to-
bacco smoking [11], obesity due to unhealthy eating habits
and physical injury due to extreme sports [8]. Although
we know of no medical system fully implementing the
idea of personal responsibility in priority setting, it has
aroused interest among policymakers in several countries
[4]. In Sweden, a 2007 survey report from the National
Centre for Priority Setting in Health Care suggested that
the responsibility principle be added to the current three
principles in the Swedish ethical guidelines for priority set-
ting [12]. However, this proposition met with vigorous op-
position [13,14] and the Swedish priority guidelines from
1996 thus far remain unchanged.
Previous empirical research indicates there is some
support for the responsibility principle in medical prior-
ity setting, especially in the case of tobacco-induced dis-
ease [11]. The studies have investigated the views of the
general population [15,16] as well as those of physicians
[15-17]. Support for the responsibility principle, how-
ever, is considerably lower and more contested than sup-
port for other priority setting principles, such as the
principle of need and the principle of cost-effectiveness
[18,19]. When comparing attitudes between the general
population and physicians, the latter group seems more
reluctant to embrace the responsibility principle than
does the general population [15,16,18].
The above-mentioned studies are either interview-
based, observational studies using questionnaires or
cross-sectional studies where participants sort a list of
hypothetical patients in priority order. These methods
all bring the prioritisation dilemma to the forefront.
Thus, such study designs increase the risk of physiciansgiving politically correct answers which reflect official
policy rather than their personal opinions. To eliminate
this risk we have used an experimental design with a
prospective, randomised and controlled (blinded) trial
which should enable us also to capture such pro-
responsibility principle sentiments as physicians might
not express when asked directly whether they think re-
sponsibility for illness should matter in priority setting.
Thus, the aim of this study was to examine whether the
method chosen would reveal tacit adherence to respon-
sibility among physicians, primarily by investigating
whether or not the studied physicians would be more in-
clined to give expensive treatment to a non-smoking
lung cancer patient than to a smoking patient with the
same disease. Members of the general population were
used as reference group.
Methods
Participants
The group of physicians studied comprised a random
sample of 300 oncologists and 300 pulmonologists. From
these two groups totally 296 responded. These medical
specialities were chosen on the assumption of their be-
ing the ones usually treating the kind of patients pre-
sented in the questionnaire. As a contrast group we used
a random sample of 600 GPs, of whom 289 responded.
The random samples were recruited from all over Sweden
and drawn from a commercial database of physicians
(Cegedim/Stockholm). To check the accuracy of the data-
base, all physicians were asked to specify their main speci-
ality. Of the physicians answering the questionnaire and
stating their speciality, 169 were oncologists, 127 were
pulmonologists, and 61 did not belong to any of the three
specialities we had actually requested. Accordingly, the lat-
ter group of physicians were excluded from further ana-
lyses. The random sample of the general population
included 962 participants, of whom 513 responded. These
participants were recruited from the Stockholm area and
provided by the tax authorities (SPAR).
The introductory letter stated that participation was
optional and we assumed that completion of the ques-
tionnaire constituted consent to the study. When calcu-
lating the response rates, all questionnaires returned to
sender because undeliverable (7 among physicians, 23
among the general population) were left out. For back-
ground variables and response rates, see Table 1.
The questionnaires
Inspired by Joshua Knobe’s experimental studies on how
people ascribe intentions to others’ behaviour, we created
two case descriptions that were identical in all aspects but
one – the patient’s smoking status – to study how this
particular aspect affected responses. Thus, both ques-
tionnaires contained a brief case description involving a
Table 1 Shows background variables relevant to the randomisation of the two versions of the questionnaire
The Smoking patient The Non-smoking patient
General population
Total number and response-rate 259 (54.8%) 254 (55.6%)
Sex (M/F) 48.6%/51.4% 47.7%/52.3%
Age (median (min/max)) 50 years (21-82) 52 years (20-80)
Trust in healthcare was: High 84.5% 85.2%
Low 15.5% 14.8%
Smoking status:
Current smoker (yes) 7.5% 5.3%
Stopped smoking (yes) 35.8% 36.9%
Never smoked (yes) 56.7% 57.8%
Physicians
Numbers and response-rates
GPs 147 (50.9%) 142 (49.1%)
Oncologists 79 (46.7%) 90 (53.3%)
Pulmonologists 67 (52.8%) 60 (47.2%)
All physicians 293 (50.1%) 292 (49.9%)
Sex (M/F)
All physicians 49.7%/50.3% 53.7%/46.3%
Median age (median (min/max))
GPs 59 years (32-74) 59 years (30-76)
Oncologists 53 years (33-78) 51 years (32-75)
Pulmonologists 56 years (35-70) 57 years (35-74)
All physicians 57 years (32-78) 57 years (30-76)
Smoking status (all physicians):
Current smoker (yes) 0.3% 1%
Stopped smoking (yes) 31.8% 32.8%
Never smoked (yes) 67.9% 66.2%
The study included a random sample of physicians and members of the general population. The questionnaire was randomly provided in two versions differing in
only one aspect: in one version the patient was a smoker and in the other a non-smoker.
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cancer. It was stated that there was a novel treatment
that would prolong her life approximately 10 weeks. It
was further mentioned that this treatment was not rou-
tinely offered and that it was expensive, but no specific
cost was given. In one version of the questionnaire (see
Additional file 1), the patient was stated to be a current
smoker with a 40 pack-year history, whereas in the
other version the patient had never smoked (see
Additional file 2). Both questionnaires concluded with
the question whether or not to offer the new treatment
(response options: yes/no). We also asked whether or
not the patient’s disease was caused by tobacco smoke
and whether or not the patient could be held respon-
sible for her disease (response options: yes/no). Finally
we asked about age, sex, own smoking habits etc. – see
Table 1.Randomisation and blinding
The two versions of the questionnaire were randomly
distributed to all participants by paper mail, including
two reminders. The randomisation was executed within
each group, by allotting each participant a list number,
giving all even numbers “the smoking patient version”
and all odd numbers “the non-smoking patient version”.
Thus, within each subgroup (GPs, oncologists, pulmo-
nologists, the general population), the two versions were
distributed in equal shares. The introductory letter ig-
nored the existence of another version of the case pres-
entation. In this sense the experiment was blinded to the
respondents.
Statistics
The randomisation procedure resulted in two groups
which were similar in all relevant aspects; see Table 1.
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test or Fisher’s exact test were used to calculate p-values.
A significance level of 0.05 was chosen. The results were
also presented as proportions with a 95% confidence
interval (CI), on the assumption that non-overlapping
intervals would have resulted in significant differences
if a hypothesis-test had been applied. Logistic regres-
sion analysis was performed in order to study potential
associations and interactions between the main out-
come variable and other variables. The data were regis-
tered and analysed using the Epi-info software 6.04.
When analysing the comments, content analysis [20]
was used to register respondents’ stated reasons in sup-
port of their choice between offering and not offering
the patient the suggested treatment.
Ethics
The study protocol was approved by the Stockholm
Regional research ethics committee (Dn 2014/344-31/2).
Results
There was a significant difference in response pattern
between those who received the smoking patient version
and those who received the non-smoking patient version
of the questionnaire. As shown in Table 2, both the phy-
sicians and the members of the general population were
significantly less willing to offer the new and expensive
treatment if the patient had been smoking. This differ-
ence was larger among the general population (Chi-2 =
15.98; df = 1, p = 0.000064) than among the whole group
of physicians (Chi-2 = 10.55; df = 1, p = 0.0012).
When subgrouping according to medical specialities,
we found the above-mentioned disinclination to treat
the smoker compared to the non-smoker among oncolo-
gists and GPs only (Chi-2 = 6.1; df = 1, p = 0.013 and
Chi-2 = 4.9; df = 1, p = 0.026 respectively). Among pul-
monologists, there was no significant difference in the
inclination to treat depending upon the patient’s smok-
ing status (Chi-2 = 0.49, df = 1 and p = 0.48). See Table 2.
We also analysed the respondents’ own smoking habits
and found that, among the general population, current
smokers too were significantly less inclined to treat the
smoking patient compared to the non-smoking patientTable 2 Difference in inclination to offer treatment across me
The sm
Oncologists (n = 77) (n = 88) 64.9% (C
Pulmonologists (n = 67) (n = 59) 67.2% (C
GPs (n = 144) (n = 136) 56.3 (CI
All physicians (n = 288) (n = 283) 61.1% (C
General population (n = 252) (n = 253) 68.7% (C
Results are presented as the proportion that would offer the new, expensive treatm
smoking patient version, respectively. Numbers in brackets refer to the amount of r
intervals (CI) are given. An *means that p < 0.05.(Fisher’s exact two-tailed test, p = 0.02) – the difference
was even greater than among non-smoking respondents
from the general population; see Table 3. As very few of the
physicians stated that they were current smokers (n = 3),
this analysis was not feasible in their group.
Since almost all (95.7%) respondents who received the
non-smoking patient version of the questionnaire stated
that this patient could not be held responsible for her
disease, we focused on the response-pattern of those
who had received the smoking patient version for fur-
ther analysis. In this group, respondents from the gen-
eral population who found the patient responsible 64.2%
(CI: 57.2-71.2) stated that they would offer the new, ex-
pensive treatment. Among those who found the smoking
patient not responsible for her disease, 82.5% (CI: 72.6-
92.4) would offer treatment (Chi-2 = 6.7, df = 1, p = 0.01).
In contrast, we found no such differences among the
physicians, neither when the whole group was analysed
(Chi-2 = 0.00, df = 1, p = 0.97), nor when it was sub-
grouped according to medical speciality.
We found no response-pattern associations to partici-
pants’ sex and age.
We also analysed the comments on the question of
whether to offer the patient the new and expensive treat-
ment. Even though the physicians phrased their answers
differently, the manifest content was similar to the an-
swers provided by the general population. Most, but not
all, stated reasons pro et contra treatment were also the
same, regardless of which version of the questionnaire
the respondent had received; see Table 4.
Discussion
The main finding of this study is that in a sample of
Swedish physicians as well as the general population,
more respondents were willing to offer a new, expensive
treatment to a non-smoking lung cancer patient than to
a smoking patient with the same disease. Hence, a statis-
tically significantly larger proportion of the studied phy-
sicians make a priority decision that seems to be in
conflict with the official values expressed in the ethical
platform for Swedish priority setting. However, there
was no association between perceiving that the smoking
patient was responsible for her lung cancer and thedical specialties
oking patient The non-smoking patient
I 54.2-75.6) 81.8% (CI 73.7-89.9)*
I 56-78.4) 72.9% (CI 61.6-84.2)
48.2-64.4) 69.1% (CI 61.3-75.9)*
I 55.5-66.7) 73.9% (CI 68.8-79)*
I 63-74.4) 83.8% (CI 79.3-88.3)*
ent among the group that received the smoking patient version and the non-
espondents having received each version of the questionnaire. 95% confidence
Table 3 Difference in inclination to offer treatment depending upon respondent’s own smoking status
The smoking patient The non-smoking patient
Non-smokers (n = 143) (n = 147) 72% (CI 64.8-79.4) 81.6% (CI 75.3-87.9)
Previous smokers (n = 90) (n = 96) 68.9% (59.3-78.5) 86.5% (CI 79.7-93.3)*
Smokers (n = 19) (n = 14) 52.6% (CI 30.1-75.1) 92.9% (CI 79.4-100)*
Results are given for the general population only. Results are presented as the proportion that would offer the new, expensive treatment among the group that
received the smoking patient version and the non-smoking patient version, respectively. Numbers in brackets refer to the amount of respondents having received
each version of the questionnaire. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are given. An * means that p < 0.05.
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with, and could even be interpreted as indicating sup-
port for, the ethical platform. It seems as if the two find-
ings contradict each other: if physicians fully accept the
ethical platform and that the principle of responsibility
has no place in Swedish priority decision, they ought not
discriminate between the smoker and non-smoker in
this case.
Our data do not elucidate why this inconsistency of at-
titudes occurred at group level. One possibility is that a
corresponding inconsistency also exists within individual
respondents. This thought draws strength from a com-
parison with studies of peoples’ juridical intuitions,
where it has been demonstrated that some people favour
more stringent punishment while simultaneously opting
for shorter sentence length in case settings [21]. This
could be interpreted as a kind of mental compartmental-
isation: perhaps people do not realise they are expressing
responsibility-based intuition when asked about how to
choose in a specific case, even if that is what they are
doing. Therefore they can say they accept the official
values expressed in laws, platforms, and guidelines, but
still make case judgements that are at variance with the
same values. Putting it in Rawlsian language: they have
failed to achieve a reflective equilibrium in their value
system.Table 4 Respondents’ stated reasons for and against offering
The smoking patient
Would offer treatment Cost does not matter 21 (1
Ethical considerations 14 (
Compassion with the patie
Knowledge gain 8 (5/3)
The patient wants it 7 (3/4
Positive effects of treatmen
Patient is young 2 (2/-)
Would not offer treatment Cost matters 22 (11/11)
Ethical considerations 3 (3
Negative effects of treatme
Comments are grouped by which version of the questionnaire respondents had rec
in brackets refer to amount of comments from the general population and physiciaThe other possibility does not imply failure of reflect-
ive equilibrium on an individual level, but rather that the
respondents discriminate against the smoker for some
reason other than the perception that the she is respon-
sible for her illness. Even so, this reason must be related
to the fact that she is a smoker as this is the only differ-
ence between the two versions of the questionnaire, and
it still contradicts the ethical platform, but not necessar-
ily by supporting the responsibility principle. With either
possibility, what remains to be explained is why some
physicians harbour such forceful anti-smoker sentiments
as to effectively overrule their stated disinclination to let
the issue of responsibility for illness govern the decision
to treat. More on this later.
In our study, oncologists were more inclined than GPs
to offer the new, expensive treatment, regardless of the
patient’s smoking status. This might have to do with the
difference in perspectives and interests between the two
groups of physicians. GPs seldom treat terminal cancer
patients and, as a general rule, seldom prescribe very
expensive types of medication. Indeed, among the com-
ments from GPs in our material, many stated that tax-
payers’ money ought preferably to be used for preven-
tion or in the treatment of curable diseases.
In their comments GPs also expressed that since the
patient derives no long-term benefit from the treatment,treatment
The non-smoking patient
6/5) Compassion with the patient 15 (11/4)
11/3) Cost does not matter 13 (8/5)
nt 12 (6/6) The patient wants it 10 (8/2)
Positive effects of treatment 7 (3/4)
) Ethical considerations 4 (3/1)
t 3 (2/1) Knowledge gain 4 (2/2)
Patient is young 1 (1/-)
Cost matters 20 (12/8)
/-) Negative effects of treatment 6 (3/3)
nt 2 (2/-)
eived. Numbers before brackets refer to total amount of comments; numbers
ns, respectively.
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academic discourse, this interpretation of medical need
is called the capacity to benefit perspective [22]. Al-
though not uncontested, this view is not in apparent
conflict with the Swedish priority setting guidelines [5].
Oncologists, on the other hand, have quite a different
professional perspective than the GPs, as they are the
ones who actually work with this group of patients.
Thus, they are closely familiar with the kind of treat-
ment described in the questionnaire. Also, oncologists
participate more often than GPs in the development of
these kinds of new drugs and drug regimens. Indeed,
some comments from oncologists in our material illus-
trated that they think that when a new treatment exists,
it should be used. As one (oncologist) respondent rhet-
orically stated: why develop new drugs if we aren’t going
to use them?
Interestingly, pulmonologists differed from GPs, on-
cologists and the general population, in that they did not
discriminate between the smoking and the non-smoking
patient in their inclination to treat. Perhaps this is due
to the fact that pulmonologists are very used to working
with smoking and ex-smoking patients from their ex-
perience with COPD patients. Indeed, several comments
from pulmonologists indicated they sought to put the
question of responsibility in perspective by discussing
the role of the tobacco industry, tobacco addiction and
genetic vulnerability.
The above findings are in apparent contrast to the
study by Neuberger et al where GPs, gastroenterologists
and the general population were asked to rank criteria
for patient selection in the case of liver transplantation
[15]. In that study only the gastroenterologists – who
work just as closely with potential liver transplant pa-
tients as oncologists do with lung cancer patients –
stated that alcohol consumption should be rated as one
of the three most important criteria. However, this dif-
ference could very plausibly be explained with reference
to consequentialist reasoning. Our study focused on a
marginally life-prolonging medication for a dying lung
cancer patient, unlike Neuberger’s potentially curative
treatment where the gastroenterologists might be con-
cerned with the effect of continued alcohol consumption
on the transplant survival.
Regardless of which version of the questionnaire they
had received, physicians were less inclined to offer the
treatment than were the respondents from the general
population. This might indicate physicians have a greater
sense of economic awareness regarding medical treat-
ment, or result from the fact that physicians are more
used than lay persons to the thought of restricting access
to treatment [16].
Interestingly, we found that smoking respondents in
the general population were even less inclined to offertreatment to the smoking case patient than were the
non-smoking respondents. On first thought, one might
expect the smoker subgroup to have been more lenient
towards smoking patients, especially since this would be
in their own best interest. However, there is a body of
literature suggesting a “self-blaming” attitude among
smokers that could explain this observation [23].
Why, then, is there such a negative bias against smok-
ing? Obviously, the many health risks, even outside of
lung cancer, play a role. Furthermore, comments in the
present material indicate that respondents perceive
smoking to be a personal choice, of the kind for which
the individual should bear the consequences. One fur-
ther reason for anti-smoking sentiment is based upon
notions of (economic) solidarity. This view was also
expressed in many comments, but none put is as suc-
cinctly as American philosopher Daniel Wikler: “The
person who takes risks with his own health gambles with
resources which belong to others” [24].Implications of the study
If a subgroup of Swedish physicians use smoking status
as a criterion in priority setting, as indicated in the
present study, this is in violation of the intentions of the
Swedish guidelines for priority setting in health care.
Interestingly, this violation appears to stem, not from
physicians wholeheartedly embracing the responsibility
principle – as no association was seen between percep-
tion of responsibility for illness and inclination to treat –
but possibly from lack of reflective equilibrium or from
anti-smoker sentiment as described above. In order to
resolve such inconsistencies or anti-smoker sentiment,
in-depth discussions among Swedish physicians about
the guidelines and their implications are probably
needed. Also, observations of clinical practice are needed
in order to determine whether these expressed values in-
fluence real-world priority setting. Furthermore, we de-
scribe a new method of inquiry into case-based decision
making that can reveal controversial opinions even in
the face of clear official guidelines. It might very well
prove fruitful to apply this method to other harmful ac-
tivities than smoking. Broadening the perspective, we
think other questions in applied medical ethics could be
addressed using this method.Strengths and limitations of the study
The obvious strength of this study lies in the fact that it
was conducted within the framework of an experimental,
randomised and controlled trial, placing it higher in the
evidence hierarchy than previous studies in this field. It
was this experimental design that enabled us to reveal the
difference between case-specific and official values and
norms described above. Furthermore, as the randomisation
Björk et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2015) 16:28 Page 7 of 8process resulted in comparable groups regarding relevant
aspects, the design minimised the risk of bias.
However, due to the relatively low response-rate
among physicians, we cannot know to what degree the
results are generalisable. Comments made by the re-
spondents indicate that the physicians found the case
description over-simplified, which could be a reason for
the low response rate in that group.
The framing of the patient case in the questionnaire,
in regard to the cost and expected effect of the new
treatment, is also likely to have influenced the overall
proportions of both physicians’ and the general popula-
tions’ inclination to offer treatment in both cases. Had
the cost of the treatment been explicitly stated (and set
rather low), more responders would probably have of-
fered treatment – and vice-versa. However, the absolute
proportions of those inclined to offer the proposed treat-
ment are not our primary focus. Rather, the core issue is
the demonstrated difference across the studied groups
regarding inclination to treat the patient depending
upon her smoking status.
Among the general population in our sample, there
were only 5% current smokers. According to healthcare
reports we would have expected rates of around 12-13%
[25]. One smoking respondent from the general popula-
tion stated that, to her, the questions were too sensitive
to answer. If that feeling is shared by many smokers, it
could help to explain the low inclusion of smokers. Also,
there are well known socio-economical associations be-
tween smoking and education that render smokers less
inclined to answer any questionnaire.Conclusions
This study indicates that applying an experimental design
allows us to go beyond the official norms and to show
that, compared to a smoking patient, both the general
population and physicians are more inclined to treat a
non-smoking patient. This clearly runs counter to the offi-
cial Swedish health care norms. It also seems to run coun-
ter to the fact that, among the physicians studied, there
was no association between finding the patient responsible
for her disease and the inclination to treat her. We think
these paradoxical findings merit further studies.Additional files
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